

SPEED LETTER		REPLY REQUESTED		DATE 7 May 1976
		YES	NO	LETTER NO. N-76-199
TO : ATTN: Dick Lehman		FROM: William E. Nelson DD/O		
<p>SUBJECT: Draft response to Bill Bundy</p> <p>Dick:</p> <p>I scribbled some marginalia. On the whole a good job.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Bill</i> Bill HP</p>				
REPLY				SIGNATURE
				DATE
<p>Page 2: This whole section strikes me as being dated. I'm not sure the mood isn't changing faster even in the "mainstream".</p> <p>Page 5: I object to the DCI saying the underlined. The analyst may not like clandestine activity but he ought to at least moot the point in view of the fact that it is USG policy to do it.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(nor do we expect them to defend things they themselves do not accept)</p> <p>Page 7: Compared to what? (Sentence reads: We desperately need clandestine collection, but it is <u>expensive</u> and dangerous.</p> <p>Page 8: Affected? Last sentence of last paragraph on page: In any case, there is no question that the nation's confidence in its intelligence service has been <u>shaken</u>;</p>				
				SIGNATURE

UNCLASSIFIED				CONFIDENTIAL				SECRET			
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP											
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS						DATE		INITIALS		
1	Dick Lehman										
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ACTION				DIRECT REPLY				PREPARE REPLY			
APPROVAL				DISPATCH				RECOMMENDATION			
COMMENT				FILE				RETURN			
CONCURRENCE				INFORMATION				SIGNATURE			
Remarks: <p>Dick - I scribbled some marginalia. On the whole a good job. Bui</p>											
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER											
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.									DATE		
									7 May 76		
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Dear Bill,

Some days ago I promised you a reply to your thoughtful letter. It has taken longer than I expected because your letter served to trigger some reexamination of our situation.

Your thesis as we understand it is that the overt, analytic side of the Agency should be organizationally divorced from the clandestine. This would open the door to a reestablishment of close links between intelligence analysis and the intellectual resources of the universities. Confronting this, we have asked ourselves four questions. What is the present state of these relationships? What improvements could be achieved by the divorce you propose? What would be its costs? Would the costs be worth the gain?

Let me say at the beginning that I can only agree with your view that the intelligence profession does not stand well in what you call the "mainstream" of American thought. That said, however, it must also be said that our problem is much narrower in one sense and much broader in another than you imply.

It is narrower because the opposition in principle to clandestine operations is confined to a relatively small but

highly articulate and influential group. These critics are strongest in the major universities, and strongest there in the Eastern ones with which you and I are most familiar. With a few exceptions, they represent the liberal arts and social sciences rather than the physical sciences, and within the social sciences they do not include many scholars of Communist societies. On the other hand, the "mainstream" strongly influences the editorial (and the news) content of the New York Times, the Washington Post, the New York Review of Books, the New Yorker, etc. These publications build a sort of prison of fashionable attitudes. When we deal with the currents of intellectual life outside prison walls, we find a great deal of sympathy and support.

On the other hand, the problem is much broader than intelligence. The "mainstream" has, to varying degrees, turned its back on defense and on foreign policy. A few will have nothing to do with government itself. A much greater number believe that our national energies should be concentrated on domestic problems. Their concern over intelligence issues is obviously great, partly because of the lurid way in which these issues are presented and partly because these issues epitomize for them the misdirection of American society. Nonetheless, their concern is more a symptom of neo-isolationism than its cause. We are convinced that any public acceptance of the Agency, or

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of its present analytic component, as a respectable participant in American intellectual life must wait until the "mainstream" rediscovers that guilt is no substitute for foreign policy in a less than benign world, and until it again becomes respectable to participate and assist in national government.

Even then, I concede, we will have problems, but not as great as you anticipate. The fact is that we have never been isolated from the best of academia even during the worst of the recent period. In fact, we are probably less "monastic" now than we have ever been. The difference is that the people with whom we deal find it necessary to be circumspect if they are not to be hounded by the emotional and the trendy among their colleagues. For this reason you are probably unaware just how deep and extensive these relationships are. Some examples, at the risk of inflicting on you a statistic or two:

-- You tell of the immense amount of contact that "used to exist" between the overt side and the universities. The Office of Political Research (formed when ONE was broken up) has maintained through all the nastiness of the past few years regular and active exchange:

° At Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, MIT, Amherst, etc., with 39 senior faculty;

°At Chicago, California, Michigan,
etc., with 41 senior faculty;

° At other institutions (in-
cluding six foreign) with 32
senior faculty.

-- You asked how long it has been since a scholar
from the outside joined the Agency for a year
or so. The answer is that there are two such
on board now.

-- You note that our people used to be able to
go freely to academic centers. This year
we have 17 analysts on sabbaticals at various
universities. Over a hundred others, openly
identified as CIA, have attended almost 60
professional meetings (American Political
Science Association, etc.) and 32 presented
or were scheduled discussants of papers.

-- OPR and the Offices of Economic and Strategic
Research all have panels of distinguished
scholars to review their output and their
programs. Many of these people put in a
good deal of time at Langley.

Perhaps in the long run more important, we are making a
major effort to break our product out of its security wrappings.

There is already a respectable flow of unclassified or declassified CIA product to the academic world. We expect it to grow.

In our experience, all but the most hysterical of faculty and students are sophisticated enough to make a distinction between the overt and analytic and the covert and operational. While our analysts on campus have a great deal of arguing to do when there are revelations of clandestine activity, they are not held responsible, nor do we expect them to defend things they themselves do not accept.

Recruiting is another matter. It is true that we have more exceptional applicants than we can take, and that we are able to hire impressive young officers. You are quite right, however, that we are not drawing the cream of the crop as both DDI and DDP did in the 50's. I wish this were not the case, but the fact is that in the 70's people of this caliber simply are not interested in federal service of any kind (except possibly Congressional staff work).

We assess our academic relationships, taken overall, not to be in bad shape, especially when we consider the strains to which they have been subjected by largely irrelevant events. Obviously they can be improved. In particular we would like to have the very best men from the very best schools competing to join us, and we would prefer that our associates on the campuses did not have to worry over the effect their association might

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have on their students or their peers. A divorce from the Clandestine Services would help, at least in the latter instance, but its effect on recruitment or on our ability to broaden our present exchanges would be marginal. Any fundamental change must await an even more fundamental change in the fashionable view of what an intellectual owes to his country. This will depend more on the personality and policies of the next President, or the one after that, than on anything we do in intelligence.

What do we lose by separation of analysis from operations? In our view, a great deal. It is interesting that the Senate Select Committee and its staff opened ~~its~~ hearings largely convinced that there should be a divorce and ended, grudgingly, much less convinced. Its recommendation (pp. 449-451, copy attached) finally was that the new Oversight Committee should "give consideration" to this idea. Its objective, moreover, was primarily to relieve the DCI of a potential conflict of interest. The Harvard University Institute of Politics, Study Group on Intelligence Activities, produced a paper on this subject which is also quoted in the Select Committee's report (pp. 527-532, copy attached). I think the Study Group has the equities about right, especially in the dangers of placing the DDO in State or Defense, or of trying to maintain it in an independent position.

I would put even more weight, however, on the interdependence of Operations, Intelligence, and Science and Technology. As you remember, the linkage between the analyst and the clandestine operator was once tenuous indeed. It is still not as close as we would like it, but year by year it improves.

In your letter you treat only with the substantive contribution that the operator can make. I think you downplay far too much the value of lengthy, on the scene immersion in a nation's politics, but there is an even more important consideration. We desperately need clandestine collection, but it is expensive and dangerous. We cannot afford to have it operate in a vacuum if it is to operate with reasonable efficiency and minimum risk. It must therefore be closely linked to the analyst's function. The greatest value of this relationship comes from the contribution of the analyst, not of the operator. The operator learns from the analyst what sources to seek and what questions to ask. He gets a continuous evaluation of his product. The analyst in turn gets a clear picture of the reliability and access of the source, and he can ask the follow-up questions. Thus, the collection process can be steered to make it more responsive to national requirements, and to make the ultimate product substantially more reliable.

In sum, we come out with different answers than yours on the four questions posed earlier. First, our external relationships in this country, while hardly ideal, are not in bad shape.

Certainly they have not been so damaged that radical surgery is essential. Second, we doubt that the surgery you propose would cure the patient; our particular difficulties are symptoms of a more general malady. Third, we rate the costs and risks of the operation considerably higher than you do. Finally, as we add these answers up in May 1976, the costs do not seem worth the gains.

One additional point. I think you will find that the concept of an evaluation function independent of policymaking is firmly lodged in doctrine. Our officers from top to bottom take it seriously indeed. Had I any mind to change it, I would lose our best people by platoons. Nor are they unaware that they have no monopoly on knowledge and wisdom. They are encouraged to face outward, to seek information and advice wherever it may be had, and to engage in informed debate with their lay colleagues. And this exchange, even in these harried times, continues to be fruitful.

I do not wish to appear complacent, however. After a bruising political campaign things may add up quite differently. Nor have we had time to assess the impact on the public of the Select Committee's report. In any case, there is no question that the nation's confidence in its intelligence service has been shaken; restoration of that confidence is my highest priority, and I will do whatever seems needed.

Affected ?

For now, our emphasis is on seeking greater understanding in the Congress and the press. After a few months, we will take another look. If organizational measures look sensible, we'll take them. As you point out, these are not things to be rushed at.

Again, many thanks for your letter. As you can see, we take these questions seriously. And it is healthy that we can debate them seriously with our distinguished alumni.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 5 May 76
TO: 		
ROOM NO. 7E26	BUILDING Hqs.	
REMARKS: <p style="text-align: center;">At long last a draft response to Bill Bundy. The delay is mainly because I found great difficulty in finding a suitable tone. Please let me have any comments by COB Thursday, 6 May. I hope to get it to the DCI Monday next.</p>		
FROM: Richard Lehman		
ROOM NO. 7E44	BUILDING Hqs.	EXTENSION
<small>FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55</small> <small>REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.</small> <small>(47)</small>		